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Disrupting the South Africa Parliament; Performing Opposition 1994-2010.

Since 1994 opposition politics in South Africa has largely been viewed through the lens of ‘dominant party democracy’ theory.ⁱ There have been widespread warnings from political scientists that ‘the gravest danger to South African democracy [is] the lack of opposition to the ANC’.ⁱⁱ This literature largely focuses upon South Africa’s electoral politics and paints a gloomy picture. A situation in which the ANC’s electoral dominance is undisputed concerns those who wish to see South African democracy confirmed by the ‘turn-over’ test, whereby the party in government loses an election and allows power to pass peacefully to an opposition party. There are those that argue South African elections are ostensibly ‘racial censuses’ in which the black majority votes for the ANC and the white, Indian and so-called coloured minorities vote for opposition parties replicating the societal divisions that apartheid created and maintained.ⁱⁱⁱ There are others that argue that voters are not motivated by racial solidarity but rather that political parties have increasingly articulated and mobilised racial identities as a marker of difference in electoral politics in the context of a macro-economic consensus amongst all the main parties.^{iv} This article shifts focus away from electoral politics directly and instead explores the quotidian dynamics of institutional disruption in the South African Parliament for what it can reveal about opposition politics in South Africa since 1994. The significance of legislative disruption within South African politics lies in the reminder it provides of the (always) ongoing transformation of parliament in the broader processes of South Africa’s ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’ of democracy. The institutional change marked by the 1994 elections did not just involve ‘the replacement of one shared cultural script by another’.^v As Thelen has argued ‘institutional change’ is constituted by ‘incremental political struggles’, which in the case of the South African parliament are often visible in debates over disruption.^{vi}

Since 1994 the most common form of institutionally punished disruption seen in South Africa’s National Assembly has been individual MPs disregarding the authority of the chair and subsequently being ordered to withdraw from the chamber for the rest of the day’s sitting. This individualised form of disruption has nevertheless been powerfully inflected by the strong party ties of the National Assembly.^{vii} More than once, the withdrawal of one MP has resulted in an opposition party walk-out. These moments are highly theatricalised ‘performances’ of political opposition, which is to say they are to varying degrees planned, stage-managed and ‘playing’ to an audience. Such performances are also ‘performative’ in that they articulate embodied discourses such as gender, race and class. This article

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explores the shifting dynamics of such ‘set-piece’ dramatisations of opposition and their relationship with the established analyses of political opposition in post-apartheid South Africa. It is argued that these disruptions are actually one of the principle means by which opposition political parties perform narratives of ANC dominance and as such require much more attention and critical engagement from political scholars. There have been two main styles of disruptive performance in the National Assembly since 1994 which are explored in the analysis which follows: firstly, performances of perceived political marginalisation, and secondly, performances that paradoxically lay claim to uphold parliamentary democracy through rule breaking, what I have termed here procedure-as-democracy.

The article is divided into four parts. The first part sets out the institutional and wider political context of disruption in the South African parliament before turning specifically to examine orders to withdraw since 1994. The second part gives an overview of these orders to withdraw. The two remaining sections then explore more fully the use of disruption, firstly, to perform political marginalisation and secondly, to perform procedure-as-democracy.

The Institutional and Political Context

The ANC has won all four parliamentary elections held since 1994 with a huge majority: 62.6% in 1994, 66.4% in 1999, 69.7% in 2004 and 65.9% in 2009. The idea that post-apartheid South Africa is a ‘dominant party democracy’ has become firmly established in analyses of the South African parliament in light of these electoral results. There are what Roger Southall has called ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ variants of the theory, but even those characterised as ‘weak’ rarely see much of a place for parliamentary opposition in South African politics in a situation where minority parties have no hope of being elected as an alternative government.^{viii} There are those who argue instead that political opposition to the ANC and mechanisms for holding the government to account are to be found in the Constitutional Court, civil society, or inside the governing Tri-partite alliance itself.^{ix} In this analysis the best hope for a viable parliamentary opposition lies in a future split of the trade union movement from its alliance with the ANC and the formation of an alternative political party which contests the ANC’s claim to represent South Africa’s black majority of voters. There are others who argue that the tasks of opposition are fundamentally altered by the ANC’s dominance, with its *raison d’être* becoming instead to ‘represent a diversity of interests’ and improve rather than knock-down government legislation.^x So, in a situation in which the current parliamentary opposition is widely perceived to be, at worst, irrelevant and, at best, most sensibly directed towards co-operative governance, just how have opposition political parties behaved?

Since 1994 there have been a number of twists and turns in the story of opposition politics in South Africa, which will briefly be sketched out here. The post-apartheid political landscape was fundamentally shaped by the protracted negotiations which followed De Klerk’s unbanning of the ANC and other liberation organisations in February 1990. In the negotiation process ‘the ANC acknowledged a balance of power in which the NP retained control of the state apparatus and security forces until the

elections, and thereafter, the basic personnel of those structures would remain unchanged'.^{xi} The material result of this compromise was the Government of National Unity - a coalition government in which cabinet seats were allocated on the outcome of the 1994 elections, this saw the ANC (252 seats), and its erstwhile enemies the National Party (82 seats) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (43 seats) governing together in 1994. Since 1994 South African elections have been based on a party-list proportional representation system with no threshold for representation, so in 1994 there were four other parties represented in the National Assembly. The largest parties outside GNU coalition were the Freedom Front (9 seats) and the Democratic Party (7 seats), with the Pan Africanist Congress (5 seats) and the African Christian Democrats (2 seats) also represented. Even though the National Party was recognised as the official opposition, as a partner within the GNU it pursued a policy of 'co-operative governance'. In 1996 De Klerk withdrew the National Party from the GNU but the party struggled to find its place in the opposition landscape. Giliomee et al have suggested that National Party politicians expected to be needed in the new dispensation, that the white civil service, security forces and business class would demand their presence but that in practice the establishment quickly adjusted to working with the ANC and in the eyes of the public the Truth and Reconciliation Commission destroyed the NP's moral standing as 'co-founders' of the new system.^{xii}

In the first parliament the DP made a name for itself by pursuing a 'robust' opposition style.^{xiii} The party made its stance very clear during the 1999 election, adopting its now infamous 'fight back' slogan, which many saw as galvanising opposition to the ANC in racial terms; as Maloka has described it, in this election the DP 'positioned itself as an effective mouthpiece and custodian of white minority interests'.^{xiv} After the election in which the DP won 38 seats, the ANC reportedly warned its members that the DP's effective use of questions in parliament might have contributed to its success.^{xv} The IFP and the (New) NP saw a decline in their fortunes in 1999 winning 34 and 28 seats respectively – widely interpreted as a rejection of their 'co-operative' opposition strategies. Nine other smaller parties won seats. In this context in June 2000 the New National Party and the Democratic Party announced a coalition they called the Democratic Alliance. However, by November of 2001 this coalition had 'sprung apart' again.^{xvi} NNP leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk led an 'exodus' of senior NNP politicians from the DA first into a 'consensus on policy issues' with the ANC before eventually joining them after the 2004 election.^{xvii}

The DA has subsequently consolidated itself as the official opposition and continued to modestly increase its share of the vote in the 2004 elections in which it won 50 seats and then in 2009 when it won 67 seats. Its stance and tactics altered slightly after 2007 when Helen Zillie, then mayor of Cape Town was elected party leader, and thus became in her words 'the only leader of an opposition party in government'.^{xviii} This position was strengthened when the DA also won the provincial elections in the Western Cape in 2009 and Zillie became Premier of the Western Cape. There are clearly both risks and benefits for the party in straddling a role in government and opposition as it now does. Zillie's agenda as leader of the DA has generally been one of broadening the party's appeal. In this context the DA's

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appetite for alliances has continued apace, in 2010 they announced an agreement with the Independent Democrats which led to Patricia De Lille standing as the DA's candidate for Mayor of Cape Town in 2011 and winning. In October 2011 the National Assembly became the showcase for this strategy when, with Zillie and De Lille's backing, Lindiwe Mazibuko, a young (31 years old) black woman, was elected as parliamentary leader of the DA. These developments occurred whilst this article was being written and as a result are not considered in-depth here. Mazibuko significantly breaks the mould of DA leadership to date. It is a tantalizing question as to how her leadership style and participation in disruption in parliament might differ from her predecessors.

2007-8 also witnessed what many at the time saw as the most significant development in opposition politics since 1994: a splinter from the ANC following Jacob Zuma's election as ANC leader and Thabo Mbeki's resignation (or recall) from the Presidency in 2007. The Congress of the People formed towards the end of 2008, just in time to contest the 2009 elections with some success (winning 30 seats). Analysing its early policy documents Susan Booysen identified that COPE focused on 'procedural issues', holding the ANC up to its own standards and 'its truthfulness to the foundational principles of South African democracy'.^{xix} However, since 2009 COPE has disintegrated somewhat with some members defecting back to the ANC and a damaging power struggle between its two leading founders emerging.^{xx} In 2004 there were 12 parties in total that won seats in the National Assembly, and 2009 there were 13. The official opposition and the third party (the IFP in 2004, COPE in 2009) thus continued to operate in what might be typified by those looking for a single, strong alternative party as a 'fragmented' opposition landscape.

Robert Schrire has argued that in this context there are three possible opposition styles open to South African political parties: 'robust', 'co-optive' and 'co-operative'.^{xxi} By its very nature the outright disruption of proceedings of the National Assembly which results in an order for an MP to withdraw from the chamber does not fit easily into this schema. The classification is not all that helpful in unpicking the dynamics of such disruption nor does it help to capture the performative, symbolic aspects of these political acts.

Punished Disruption: An Overview

The rules and orders of the National Assembly in 1994 were largely those of the previous parliament, from which anything unconstitutional or not applicable to the new bi-cameral legislature was removed. During the first parliament, these initial rules were then amended by the Rules Committee (chaired by the Speaker of the National Assembly) so as to comply with the 1996 Constitution and to reflect the democratic ethos of the new parliament. In this spirit, the first amendment in May 1994 made parliamentary committees automatically open to the public unless a committee specifically decided otherwise. During this time the rules concerning members' behaviour and disciplining were not

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significantly changed, apart from the incorporation of a member's right to freedom of speech.^{xxii} Rule 51 of the Rules of the National Assembly on 'member ordered to withdraw' states that:

51. If the presiding officer is of the opinion that a member is deliberately contravening a provision of these rules, or that a member is in contempt of or disregarding the authority of the Chair, or that a member's conduct is grossly disorderly, he or she may order the member to withdraw immediately from the chamber for the remainder of the day's sitting.^{xxiii}

Rule 53 further states that a member ordered to withdraw must withdraw from the precincts of parliament.^{xxiv} The continuity of rules however belies the ongoing contestation surrounding norms of behaviour in the post-1994 parliament. What is clear from MPs' accounts of the early days of the new parliament is that the use of parliamentary rules and procedure was a point of tension between political opponents. For example, one ANC MP told Hannah Britton about the culture shock she experienced entering parliament for the first time:

I remember the first day in the chamber. And here came these other people in the parties. And they were coming in here with motions and motions and one after the other. And the way we were quiet! We didn't like this, but what does one do? How could we stop it? The air was tension. We all looked around, "What is this? What is happening?" But when we left the chamber we said, "This must never happen again!" Because I saw [members of parties within the previous government] enjoying it. They had caught us. We didn't know the rules of parliament, the procedures of all that.^{xxv}

Whilst all new members of institutions undoubtedly experience culture shock the entry of anti-apartheid liberation movements into the former seat of white power and privilege in 1994 was a particularly emotional and fraught process which lent disruption and its punishment heightened figurative resonance.

A statistical overview of members' behaviour and the Presiding Officers' use of disciplinary powers, compiled from the Minutes and Proceedings of the National Assembly are set out in Table 1. During the first democratic parliament, between the years 1994 and 1999, 9 MPs were ordered to withdraw from the chamber. These instances were concentrated in the later half of the parliament; the first order to withdraw was not given until March of 1996. In the second parliament between 1999 and 2004 no orders to withdraw were given – although a larger volume of MPs withdrew remarks following a ruling from the Chair. In the third parliament between 2004 and 2009 9 MPs were ordered to withdraw. At the time of writing, in the fourth democratic parliament two MPs have been ordered to withdraw from the chamber. Statistics on 'personal explanations' over the same period show a dramatic decrease after the first parliament. A tentative suggestion from this picture is that rule-breaking may have become more purposeful.

Table 1. Apologies and Withdrawals in the National Assembly 1994-2010.			
Parliament	Personal Explanations	Withdrawal of Remarks	Order to Withdraw from Chamber
1994-1999	16	15	9
1999-2004	6	30	0
2004-2009	2	11	9
2009- present	0	2	2

In every case except one the members asked to withdraw have been men (see Table 2). The only woman ordered to withdraw from the chamber was also an exception as the only member of the ANC. In the first two parliaments MPs asked to withdraw were most often members of opposition parties of the right-wing, the Freedom Front, Inkatha Freedom Party and National Party but the last two parliaments have seen more MPs ordered to withdraw who are from the liberal/conservative, Democratic Alliance, by then the largest opposition party in the National Assembly. Petrus Johannes Groenewald from the Afrikaner nationalist party the Freedom Front (Plus) has been the MP most often expelled: he has been ordered from the chamber four times since 1994. Groenewald, as a member of the last white parliament prior to 1994 was also ordered to withdraw from that chamber twice between 1990 and 1994.

Table 2. List of Members Ordered to Withdraw from the National Assembly 1994-2010.	
28 March 1996 – Rev. M Abrahams (IFP) 13 March 1997 – Dr WA Odendaal (NP) 22 May 1997 – Mr MA Mncwango (IFP) 28 February 1998 – Mr A Fourie (NP) 10 March 1998 – Mr AJ Leon (DP) 20 August 1998 – Mr PJ Groenewald (FF) 31 August 1998 – Mr A Williams (NP) 24 March 1999 – Mr NM Muendane (PAC) 25 March 1999 – Mr PJ Gronewald (FF) 11 November 2004 – Mr MJ Ellis (DA)	22 June 2005 – Mr EW Trent (DA) 13 October 2005 – Mr CM Lowe (DA) AND – Mr M Waters (DA) 16 November 2005 – Ms MP Mentor (ANC) 20 June 2006 – Mr PJ Groenewald (FF) 8 November 2006 – Mr JH Van Der Merwe (IFP) 5 September 2007 – Mr M Waters (DA) 12 February 2009 – Mr PJ Groenewald (FF) 16 February 2010 – Mr M George (COPE) 11 November 2010 – Mr D Maynier (DA)

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In Table 3 below the reason for withdrawal in each of these cases has been identified in general terms. Clearly some incidents are more complex than others and what is set out here is the Presiding Officer's stated reason for ordering the MP in question to withdraw, although an MP's behaviour surrounding the immediate confrontation will also be important. One incident discussed in detail in section four serves as an example of the complexity of identifying the reason for the order to withdraw. Mike Waters was ordered to withdraw in September 2007, an incident I have classified as 'challenging behaviour' because the Speaker ordered Waters to withdraw when he continued to argue with her decision. However, the incident arose due to the Speaker's judgement that a question Waters asked was out of order. Hence it might also have been classified as 'not following procedure'. Table 3 thus functions as a rather crude overview that should be treated with caution.

Table 3. Reasons that MPs have been asked to withdraw from the chamber since 1994.

Reason for Order to Withdraw	Number of Instances
Un-parliamentary remarks made during debate	12
Heckling	3
Not following procedure, eg. Attack made on member without substantive motion	3
Challenging Behaviour eg. Won't sit down	2

At least one insight does seem to emerge from this overview: the prevalence of un-parliamentary remarks leading to orders to withdraw. Interestingly, the incidents of un-parliamentary remarks mostly took place in the first parliament of the democratic era (1994-1999). It seems that in the early years when co-operative governance held sway in the GNU, orders to withdraw largely concerned personal animosity or attacks of a personal nature. Three concerned personal attacks about the apartheid-era conduct of a fellow MP or politician. Five involved use of racist language, or one member calling another 'racist'. In this respect they involved conflict over the boundaries of acceptable debate in post-apartheid South Africa. In the third and fourth parliament issues of discipline, physical behavior and following procedure, came to the fore as the personnel involved shifted too. The withdrawals in the third and fourth parliaments have tended to centre on the issue of punishment being perceived as unfair by opposition politicians.

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However, a discourse on disruption and unfair punishment within parliament first rose to public prominence between 1997 and 1999, not following an order to withdraw but during a legal battle between PAC MP Patricia De Lille and the first Speaker Dr Frene Ginwala outside parliament. On October 22 1997, De Lille, an MP for the PAC, a rival liberation organisation to the ANC, named a number of senior ANC members as being apartheid-era spies in the National Assembly. She was instructed to stop by the Speaker on the grounds that ‘making unsubstantiated allegations against the integrity of any member is un-parliamentary’.^{xxvi} De Lille followed the Speaker’s order and withdrew the remarks. In the National Assembly chamber De Lille’s comments provoked ‘a state of uproar’ in the government benches but after her withdrawal of un-parliamentary remarks the incident might have rested there.^{xxvii} However, the following day the ANC Chief Whip gave notice that he would propose a motion that De Lille’s behaviour be investigated by an Ad-Hoc parliamentary committee. Such a committee was established despite cross-party opposition protests that ‘because De Lille had withdrawn her statements there was nothing to investigate’.^{xxviii} The committee recommended that De Lille be suspended for 15 days, a decision she chose to appeal through the courts.

In two court cases, first at the Cape High Court and then the Supreme Court, De Lille won and her suspension was overturned.^{xxix} Whilst the incident had involved no procedurally disruptive behaviour on the part of De Lille it had been deemed figuratively disruptive by parliamentary authorities. The ANC argued she had ‘undermined the dignity of the House’ and ‘made a mockery of parliamentary privilege’.^{xxx} However, in his August 1999 judgement, Chief Justice Ismail Mohamed found that whilst ‘the National Assembly was empowered by the Constitution to control its internal arrangements and proceedings [and] this included the power to suspend from the Assembly, for temporary periods, any MP who was disrupting or obstructing its proceedings. It did not follow from this that the Assembly necessarily had the authority to suspend De Lille when she was not disrupting proceedings. It was clear that De Lille was suspended “as some kind of punishment” for her statements, which had not disrupted parliament’.^{xxxi} This case was a very important backdrop for the incidents considered here. It confirmed that in South Africa, parliament was subordinate to the Constitution and that its internal affairs were subject to judicial scrutiny. It provided evidence that in this incident the ANC had apparently used its procedural power within parliament to punish a political opponent. Finally, it also established individual conflict or a show-down with the ANC as a means of constructing a media profile for an opposition politician. De Lille was framed positively in media discourses in a way which drew heavily on the memory of Helen Suzman and was presented as a principled lone crusader against an arrogant government.

A perceived partiality of the Speakership and an accompanying discourse on unfair punishment intensified under the second Speaker Baleke Mbete. Mbete, who was Speaker from 2004 became in late 2007 National Chairperson of the ANC, head of the ANC’s Political Committee; a combination of roles that many saw as compromising the desired neutrality of the Speakership.^{xxxii} However, the assumption

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of ‘Westminster’ norms on neutrality was something that Mbete herself rejected. In 2006 following a debate on her conduct she argued in parliament that:

It is wrong to assume that our system is the same as Canada or the House of Commons or wherever because this is South Africa. In fact here we have decided that we [the Speaker] remain political. I remain a member of the ANC caucus and I go to it, unlike in Lesotho where the Speaker is not even a member of parliament.^{xxxiii}

The Speakership became a key battleground for contesting ‘Westminster norms’ and the scope and tenor of ANC power within parliament. Orders to withdraw, as we shall see became a crucial weapon in this battle. The discourse on unfair punishment during the third parliament was also linked with much broader discussions of the ethical behaviour of MPs. Since allegations first surfaced in the late 1990s a number of MPs, mostly from the ruling ANC have been implicated in what has become known as Travelgate, an investigation into MPs misuse of travel vouchers given to them for carrying out official business. The last of 30 MPs to be investigated was convicted of theft only in September 2009.^{xxxiv} Apparent leniency towards these MPs, indeed Mbete was actually accused of protecting some from investigation, has formed a very important part of discussions of appropriate behaviour for MPs.^{xxxv} Opposition parties have also complained that the ANC dominates the chamber of the National Assembly as part of their justification for disruption. Opposition MPs express unhappiness that the ANC drown out other speakers with noise, sometimes controversially animal noises, that they apparently ‘bus in’ party supporters to fill the public gallery during important debates and that the gallery joins in the clapping, singing, dancing and toyi-toying.^{xxxvi} All of these complaints are important for opposition parties to contextualise their own disruptive behaviour as a response. The remainder of the article now goes on to explore in greater detail, firstly, instances of punished disruption which performed marginalisation and secondly, those which contested the upholding of procedure-as-democracy.

Performances of Marginalisation

In the mid-1980s the governing National Party introduced reforms in an attempt to shore-up white minority rule in the face of mounting internal and international opposition to apartheid. The result of these reforms was a tri-cameral parliament made-up of three chambers, each tasked with representing a different ‘community’. One chamber (with ultimate legislative authority) was elected by a white electorate, a second by an Indian electorate and a third by a so-called ‘coloured’ electorate. The tri-cameral parliament saw very high incidents of withdrawals from the chambers of all three houses. Withdrawals were highest in the white chamber, the National Assembly, and concerned mainly MPs from the Conservative Party, the party which was then the Afrikaner nationalist party to the right of the National Party. These withdrawals peaked during the 1990s and were a feature of the very heated discussions surrounding the National Party’s ongoing negotiations with the then newly unbanned African National Congress (see Table Four). Members of the Conservative Party at that time complained that white rights were being sacrificed unnecessarily by the National Party, and their clashes with the

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Speaker were expressive of feelings of marginalisation from the process of negotiations being led by the NP and ANC and their wish to express outright rejection of the transition process.^{xxxvii} However, it may also be that withdrawals were a part of the quotidian culture of the tri-cameral parliament that reflected its ambivalent political status as a boycotted and discredited institution. In conversation, staff from the tri-cameral parliament suggested to me that if it was a sunny day an MP might provoke an order to withdraw in order to get the afternoon off work. This is a telling perception even if not necessarily verifiable.

Table 4. Orders to Withdraw from Chamber 1985-1994: The Tri-Cameral Era			
Parliament	House of Assembly	House of Representatives	House of Delegates
1984 – 1989	27	9	10
1989-1994	46	14	3

MPs who had also been members of the white parliament prior to 1994 were commonly amongst those ordered to withdraw during the first democratic parliament. It is perhaps interesting to note that other MPs who were former members of the white parliament whilst not always ordered to withdraw from the chamber after 1994, often involved themselves in discussions with Presiding Officers over rulings.^{xxxviii} It is argued here that the involvement of these men in incidents of punished disruption were indicative of a peculiar relationship with the new parliament; among its oldest members, well-versed in parliamentary procedure but also ambivalent about participation in the new democracy, representative of minority views, and lacking in moral authority. It may also be the case that these MPs carried with them a culture of disruption from the tri-cameral era. The performances of certain MPs such as Petrus J. Gronewald might be viewed as part of a process Eghosa E. Osaghae has elsewhere noted as Afrikaner nationalists', 'transmutation into an aggrieved minority.'^{xxxix}

However, the position of all post-1994 MPs has not remained static and former members of the white parliament have taken different trajectories, some such as Marthinus Van Schalkwyk who became leader of the (New) National Party later joined the ANC (in 2004). One former Conservative Party member Koos van der Merwe, who was also one of those who was often ordered to withdraw from the tri-cameral parliament prior to 1994, and who was described by one parliamentary official to me as being a 'real hard nut' back then, has reinvented himself since 1994 as a jovial elder statesman of the House. His only brush with Rule 51 in the democratic parliament was performed in a more comical vein. He was in 2006 ordered to withdraw from the National Assembly after bringing a cake, complete with

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candle with him to a debate to, in his words, 'celebrate' the incompetence of the Office of the Presidency in making him wait for a whole year to be given an appointment with the President.^{xi}

However, returning to Groenewald's rejection of successive Speaker's rulings, there can be seen, I would argue, in both his language and behaviour an attempt to symbolically perform his own political marginalisation. On 20 August of 1998 when the house was debating the Employment Equity Bill, which was a piece of legislation that instituted wide-ranging affirmative action to redress apartheid era discrimination, Groenewald would not withdraw his use of the word 'racist' to describe the Act and the Minister proposing it.^{xli} A few days later, on 27 August, the Speaker ruled unequivocally that 'it is never parliamentary to call another member racist, regardless of the context'.^{xlii} In this instance, when Groenewald refused to withdraw his comments the rest of his party, the Freedom Front, followed him from the chamber in a performance of marginalisation. General Viljoen, leader of the FF, described this at the time as 'exercising the strongest form of parliamentary protest'. However, the House Chairperson saw things a little differently saying that others should 'not assist those attempting to wreck the decorum of the House'.^{xliii} This incident certainly fits the patterns of behaviour displayed by the Conservative Party in the tri-cameral era, using a stand-off provoked by un-parliamentary language to stage a walk-out. The issue in question, affirmative action, is also noteworthy as one of the touchstones of what Steyn and Foster call 'white talk', a set of discourses whereby whiteness seeks to 'maintain its advantages in a situation in which black people have legally and legitimately achieved political power'.^{xliv} Groenewald does not deploy some of the more subtle discursive practices Steyn and Foster have identified to criticise the Employment Equity Act, instead he chooses to demonstrate outright rejection by using the term 'racist' and a wish to be seen to be, literally, forced out of parliament, and symbolically, the new South Africa.

On 25 March 1999 when asked to withdraw remarks, Groenewald made an issue of being misunderstood as he spoke in Afrikaans.^{xlv} His defence may have been accurate but again it also had important symbolic resonance. As Osaghae has argued the Afrikaans language is a continued 'rallying point' for Afrikaaner nationalists and since the 1990s language rights have been both 'a demand for the preservation of privileges as well as the basis for reconstructing a new Afrikaner identity'.^{xlvi} Groenewald's use of this defence was a means of dramatising Afrikaans as a threatened and misunderstood language and an assertion of his place as a defender of Afrikaans. In June 2006 after having referred to a Minister as a 'racist' and a 'political criminal', Groenewald argued, 'Hon. Chairperson, as you have quoted me as I spoke the truth. I cannot withdraw the truth. I refuse to withdraw it'.^{xlvii} In the latter two cases of withdrawal his use of un-parliamentary language is given a finesse not seen in the first two instances by the suggestion that his refusal to withdraw his remarks is honourable. In February 2009 after getting into trouble for saying the President had 'acted like three little monkeys', seeing, hearing and speaking no evil, he said, 'I am a man of my word. I have said it, and I will not withdraw it'.^{xlviii} When ordered to withdraw on this occasion he replied to the Deputy Speaker

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‘I do so with honour Madam. Thank You’. In this last incident, ‘I am a man of my word’ Groenewald attempted to perform an explicitly *masculine* reasonableness. His assertion that he performed an honourable retreat criticised the Deputy Speaker’s own honour by implication and did so in a way which emphasised his own and the Deputy Speaker’s opposite genders.

The Freedom Front (Plus) was a relatively small party in the National Assembly throughout this period; it had nine seats in the first parliament and currently has four. According to the rules of debate whereby parties get allocated speaking time based on the number of seats they hold, it might be suggested that the FF+ simply makes creative use of its scant resources to garner media attention. However, there is undeniably a symbolic aspect to the incidents of withdrawal. In a recent interview with Victoria Hasson, one sitting MP from the FF+ complained that post-1994, Speakers were not enforcing the rules of parliament strictly enough. He said, ‘sometimes you want to make a point, you want to be chased out, you want to demonstrate total objection, rejection. I’ve tried that in the new dispensation; I couldn’t succeed’.^{xlix} There is much that is revealing in this comment. Firstly, that some MPs wish to physically and symbolically *perform*, as opposed to simply stating, ‘total objection’. Secondly, certain MPs behavior in this way does seem to draw upon their experiences in the pre-1994 parliament. In the disruptive performances of Petrus J. Groenewald parliamentary procedure is invoked to make visible in a physical display of expulsion a perceived figurative marginalisation and ambivalence about participation felt by some Afrikaners in the new South Africa. In these incidents the disrupters use the parliamentary space as a proxy for national space and perform political marginalization (or ambivalence) as a physical expulsion. These performances arguably had particular figurative resonance during the first parliament (two of Groenewald’s four expulsions occurred 1994-1999), when issues of inclusion/exclusion in the new South Africa were especially emotionally and politically contentious for Groenewald and his supporters. Liberal/conservative politicians’ performances of disruption, to which we will now turn, have been somewhat different.

Procedure as Democracy

Despite the greater number of withdrawals by Petrus J. Groenewald arguably the most spectacular and talked about incidents of withdrawal since 1994 have involved members of what has been since 2000 the largest opposition party in the National Assembly, the Democratic Alliance. Two of these cases, one in October 2005 and a second in September 2007 have involved the DA MP Mike Waters. The second of these incidents is interesting for the speed at which it escalates from a ruling by the Speaker, rejected by opposition politicians, to a stand-off between the Speaker and Mike Waters resulting in an order for Waters to withdraw. In September 2007 Mike Waters asked a question pertaining to media reports that the Minister of Health had been convicted of theft in 1976 and whether she had disclosed this information to the President. Speaker Mbete immediately ruled that the question was out of order. Putting aside the issue as to whether this was a ruling commensurate with parliamentary rules (all rulings by presiding officers are based on interpretations of the rules following advice from Table Office

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staff) the subsequent order to withdraw was made based on Water's reaction to the ruling. The situation developed as follows:

The SPEAKER: I have ruled the question by Mr Waters out of order, because it transgresses the rules and practices of the National Assembly, particularly Rule 63, which forbids the use of offensive or unbecoming language. It is patently clear from the question that was submitted by the hon. member that it reflected on the integrity of the Minister as it impugns impropriety on her part.

As you know, it is established practice in this House that allegations against another member can only be brought before the House by way of a substantive motion, and such a motion should be properly motivated and substantiated.

Members cannot be allowed to reflect on the integrity of others in the form of questions or other means other than through the mechanisms that this House has imposed upon itself. [Interjections.] So, I am not going to debate that issue with you, Mr Davidson. I have ruled the question out of order, and am not allowing a debate about the matter. Mr Davidson, I'd like you to take your seat regarding this matter. [Interjections.]

Dr J T DELPORT: Madam Speaker, on a further point of order, may I suggest that the Chair is not in order by simply directing a member to take his seat when he is willing ... [Interjections.]

The SPEAKER: Hon Delport, I also want you to take your seat, because I am not allowing a debate on Question 254, which I have ruled out of order and that is the end of that particular issue. [Interjections.] We now come to Question 298. [Interjections.]

Mr M WATERS: Madam Speaker, as the person who submitted that question, could you refer me to the exact words which are unbecoming, please?

The SPEAKER: Hon Waters, I have finished with the issue of Question 254. If there is nothing else you want to raise, I'd like you to take your seat ...

Mr M WATERS: I would like you to direct me to those words ...

The SPEAKER: I am not allowing you ...

Mr M WATERS: ... that are unbecoming of an MP ... [Interjections.]

The SPEAKER: Hon Waters, get out of the House. [Interjections.]¹

Still attempting to protest, Waters was ordered to 'get out of the house' a further six times before he left, at one point referring to the ANC party headquarters in his retort, 'Is that an instruction from

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Luthuli House or from yourself?' Once he had finally left, the Chief Whip of the ANC rose to say 'Madam Speaker, I just wanted to warn people who want to wreck these proceedings that, for their own good, they must behave or leave parliament.'^{li} Both parties were vying for the moral high ground.

The next day the drama continued when Mbete suspended Waters from the House for 5 days describing his conduct as 'outrageous, disrespectful and grossly disorderly'.^{lii} The DA then staged a walk-out in reaction to this ruling. Sandra Botha the DA leader in the House later told the media that 'While the Speaker has the discretion to interpret parliament's rules, we believe her reasoning for first not allowing the question and then suspending Mr Waters holds no water; the only objective she achieved was to protect the minister from public scrutiny. The DA would not sit in the chamber today and form part of the Speaker's undermining of democracy. We had no option but to walk out in protest'.^{liii} In this formulation, physical presence in parliamentary space was understood by the DA to confer legitimacy upon its practices – the DA conceived of itself as, in their own words, 'defending democracy' by walking out. The troubling visual picture of a largely white party 'assuming the conscience of the nation' is a part of a process Roger Southall describes slightly euphemistically as the content of opposition criticism becoming 'blurred by the hurly-burly of insult, exchange, exaggeration and half-truth which, in SA as elsewhere, constitutes the negative aspect of party politics'.^{liv} It might well be asked, as Gerhard Maré has, what it means to continue to identify the whiteness of the opposition, but it might equally be asked what it would mean to ignore it.^{lv}

It is clear that the Mike Waters incident was to a certain extent reactive and unplanned since it emerged after a particular ruling by the Speaker, however from the content of subsequent press releases in this case and others the DA was clearly aware that should they chose to protest over a procedural issue the resulting order to withdraw formed a compelling narrative. Indeed, orders to withdraw and the flurry of media reporting around them has been an effective tool for the DA to advance its narrative that the ANC does not respect parliament and that the DA is an upholder of democracy. Far from being seen as a disgrace, being ordered to withdraw seems to be viewed as a chance to perform as an honorable and principled MP. However such disruptions have to be performed carefully in order that they can be presented as a reasonable 'reaction', something that Steyn and Foster recognize as a feature of 'white talk' which obscures 'its own aggressive impulses that initiate the dynamic'.^{lvi} In such disruptions the DA must perform in such a way as to prevent its own commitment to South African democracy being questioned.

In one of the latest withdrawal incidents that happened in February 2010 the performance was compromised when one of the DA MPs who took part in an opposition party walk-out after a Congress of the People (COPE) MP was ordered to withdraw, swore at the ANC. The initial incident had many of the same dynamics as the Mike Waters incident detailed above. On 16 February 2010 COPE MP Mluleki George was told that his statement that, 'it appears that the nation is deliberately led into lawlessness, with absolutely no morals and respect for its people', which he had made during the debate on the

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President's Address, was un-parliamentary.^{lvii} The Deputy Speaker who made the ruling stated that, 'It creates the impression that the President or his government is inciting lawlessness. Making unsubstantiated allegations about the integrity of any member is un-parliamentary'.^{lviii} George defended his statement, saying that it was political and not an attack on an individual. The leader of COPE intervened, as did the DA's Chief Whip saying that the Deputy Speaker was interfering with 'the right to freedom of speech in the House'.^{lix} COPE, the Independent Democrats and the DA proceeded to walk out following Mluleki George who was ordered to leave the chamber when he would not withdraw his statement.

I was watching from the public gallery when this incident took place and the atmosphere in the chamber was loud and highly charged. When the opposition parties began to leave ANC MPs were out of their seats, chanting 'go, go, go', clapping and waving. In this hubbub of noise DA MP Dianne Kohler Barnard swore and was, amazingly, heard by a member of the ANC, who reported her to the Speaker.^{lx} The following day the DA announced that she had been suspended by the party for 5 days, attempting to wrest back the moral high ground they had been in danger of losing through Kohler Barnard's poor performance of the honourable retreat. Their statement again played the game of equivalences: 'The DA believes in accountability and consequences, and that this action demonstrates our commitment to those principles. We challenge the ruling party to follow suit'.^{lxi} In these arguments the imperative to discipline MPs was located within political parties rather than parliament as an institution demonstrating the extent to which parliamentary behavior had become a party political battleground. The DA did not want to leave the disciplining of Kohler Barnard to parliament, whose disciplinary procedures they were trying to call into question.

Interestingly, despite the danger that the DA saw in leaving Kohler Barnard's outburst unpunished or worse punished only by parliament, Kohler Barnard seems to have received a sympathetic reaction from sections of the white media and general public. In *Die Burger* the foremost Afrikaans-language newspaper Kohler Barnard was described in several reports as 'fiesty' or 'fiery'. *Die Burger* also described her as returning to parliament after her suspension, 'dressed in fire-engine red, one of her favourite colours'.^{lxii} The idea of Kohler Barnard as a no-nonsense, straight-talking woman was something she herself suggested in her explanation immediately after the incident:

I am happy to apologise for swearing in the Assembly. I should not have done it. The portfolio I cover is a tough one and I am used to working in tough conditions and I do have a temper; so I do tend to use harsh language. But it will be typical of the ANC to make this molehill into a Table Mountain. They know I am their worst critic and they will try anything to get at me.^{lxiii}

A quick perusal of the internet comments left on the above mentioned article show that a number of *Die Burger* readers expressed a sense of solidarity with Kohler Barnard. There were a large number along the lines of 'You Go Girl!!!Don't let them get you down'.^{lxiv} The incident was quickly picked up by the

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South African chicken fast-food chain Nandos, who produced a print-advert that read: 'Dianne, There's only one place where it's ok to use fowl language'. Kohler Barnard's new found notoriety was reflected in their use of her first name only. In its reception this incident appears to overlap with the disruptive performances of Petrus J. Groenewald, in that members of the (white) public identified with Kohler Barnard's disruption of parliamentary space as linked to a figurative disruption of the national space. Her outburst became a cathartic rejection of South African politics on their behalf. The racial politics of this are interesting to note. It was *her* performance and not Mluleki George's initial defiance of the Deputy Speaker which received widespread media coverage suggesting perhaps that it is only white MP's disruptive behavior that has strong resonance for some white South Africans.

However, the main aim of the DA's disruptive performances, which Kohler Barnard compromised, appears to be to portray the ostensible rule-breakers (the DA) as more parliamentary and democratic than the rule-makers (the ANC). The most recent withdrawal is a case in point. On Thursday 11 November 2010 the DA's Shadow Defence Minister David Maynier was ordered to withdraw from the National Assembly. This particular performance was not about questioning the authority of the Speaker but trying to highlight the behavior of a Minister. The order to withdraw came at the culmination of a series of controversial parliamentary performances by David Maynier. He had been using successive Member's Statements to read out sections of a report shown to the Defence Portfolio Committee, of which he is a member. The report was one which the Minister of Defence, Lindiwe Sisulu refused to publish, on the grounds that the report contained information sensitive to national security. Maynier made Member's Statements on three successive occasions, reading out parts of the report and urging the Minister to publish it. Those ANC MPs present at the statements appeared unhappy about his behavior but did not challenge Maynier.^{lxv} He kept conspicuously within the rules until the final statement he made on the subject on 11 November when he accused the Minister of telling 'a political fib' to the House. After taking some time to consider his ruling, at the end of the day's sitting, amid an uncharacteristic hush in the chamber the Speaker ruled that this was tantamount to saying she lied, an un-parliamentary statement, and ordered Maynier to withdraw the statement. He 'respectfully refused' and left the chamber, taking care to bow elaborately to the Speaker but, I was later told, in his enthusiasm to leave, forgetting his brief case.^{lxvi} A statement from the DA Chief Whip Ian Davidson was released to the media soon after his withdrawal:

The DA stands fully behind Shadow Defence Minister David Maynier MP, and the comments that he made in parliament today regarding Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu's handling of the National Defence Force Service commission report.
Mr Maynier's expulsion from parliament, by Speaker Max Sisulu, is unacceptable. It is Minister Lindiwe Sisulu's behaviour that is un-parliamentary, and warrants rebuke.
Minister Sisulu has repeatedly been uncooperative with parliament, contravening her constitutional duties to uphold the principles of accountability and transparency.^{lxvii}

Davidson said 'it was only fair and right that such conduct was brought to Parliament's, and by extension, the South African public's attention' hinting at the degree of calculation lying behind Maynier's actions.^{lxviii} To judge by these public pronouncements this disruptive performance was about attempting to present the rule-breakers as more parliamentary than their discipliners even though in this case the DA could hardly dispute that Maynier had in fact made an un-parliamentary statement. Performances such as this ostensibly place a high value on procedure, often evoking a Westminster ideal of a politically neutral Speaker or a ruling party ready and willing to be held accountable but they do so through breaking rules and through forms of behavior ironically rarely seen in Westminster itself.^{lxix}

Conclusions

That South Africa post-1994 can be described as a dominant party democracy has become a widely-held view amongst academics. To what extent is this more than a truism of electoral politics? This article explores dominant party democracy theory as quotidian reality. One of the ways in which ANC dominance is made visible on a quotidian level is by opposition disruption. Both forms of disruption discussed here are evidence of opposition politicians and parties choosing to use symbolically resonant behavior rather than rational political discourse to voice opposition to the ANC government or its policies. Some might argue that this is because other opposition mechanisms are rendered useless in a dominant party democracy; that in a context in which they have no hope of governing opposition parties no longer see the point of behaving reasonably.^{lxx} It is interesting to consider to what extent this is mediated for the DA by its position as a governing party on the provincial level. However, we might also note that it is in part through such disruptions that ANC dominance is constituted as a public discourse.

Unpicking the symbolic content of opposition disruption since 1994 it becomes clear that more is at stake than political disagreement which has no other avenues for expression. Disruptions that perform marginalisation such as those of Groenewald and more recently Dianne Kohler Barnard symbolically articulate some white South Africans' continuing ambivalence about participating in the new South Africa. These disruptions echo forms of behavior prevalent in the tri-cameral parliament and involve knowingly stepping outside the rules of parliament in order to be 'chased out'. Disruptions that perform procedure as democracy are also performances which constitute dominant party democracy as a quotidian affect. They are not simply caused by ANC dominance as opposition discourses might have us believe but are patterned, normative forms of behavior in themselves. These incidents reveal an ongoing contestation of procedural norms in the South African parliament with the DA paradoxically evoking Westminster ideals such as Speaker neutrality through rule-breaking. This contestation has had troubling racial and gender dynamics to it, often dramatizing white male MPs as upholders of democracy in the face of the authority of black women Speakers. This is not necessarily to argue that critics of the ANC government should keep quiet if they happen to be white but rather to be attuned to the symbolic performances of disruption as choices made by the politicians involved. The reading advanced here has been one in which punished disruption highlights the difficulties of finding institutional scripts for

parliamentary behavior that are free from the exclusions of problematic universalist liberal norms. In South Africa the whiteness (and maleness) of legislative disruption which lays claims to defending democracy has an important, but unseen corollary. Hannah Britton's study of the first democratic parliament in South Africa noted that the MPs most likely to leave parliament in 1999 were black women from 'significantly disadvantaged educational and occupational backgrounds' who had found themselves in parliament as a result of their grassroots political activism under apartheid.^{lxxi} The women could seemingly not find the institutional support they needed in order to represent effectively within parliament. These women did not disrupt parliament however - they simply disappeared.

This article has compiled the first statistical overview of punished disruption in the South African National Assembly and suggested that there have been two dominant styles of performing such disruptions. It does not present a comprehensive analysis of disruption and is certainly not the last word on those incidents considered here. It is hoped it will bring disruption to the attention of those who seek to better understand South African democracy as worthy of much further study.

ⁱ *The Awkward Embrace*; Southall, *Opposition and Democracy in South Africa*.

ⁱⁱ Paremoer and Jung, "The Role of Social and Economic Rights in Supporting Opposition in Postapartheid South Africa," 200.

ⁱⁱⁱ Giliomee, Myburgh, and Schlemmer, "Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa," 162.

^{iv} Habib and Taylor, "Political Alliances and Parliamentary Opposition in post-Apartheid South Africa," 216.

^v Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 384.

^{vi} *Ibid.*

^{vii} Members of the National Assembly are elected by a proportional representation party list system, whereby seats are won by political parties not individual MPs. For a period between 2003 and 2009, 'floor-crossing windows' enabled sitting MPs to change their party affiliation and retain their seats, however, since 2009 any MP who resigns from their political party, loses their seat.

^{viii} Southall, "Emergent Perspectives on Opposition in South Africa."

^{ix} Paremoer and Jung, "The Role of Social and Economic Rights in Supporting Opposition in Postapartheid South Africa"; Habib and Taylor, "Political Alliances and Parliamentary Opposition in post-Apartheid South Africa."

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^x Nijzink, "Opposition in the New South African Parliament," 57.

^{xi} Pottie, "The Electoral System and Opposition Parties in South Africa," 30.

^{xii} Giliomee, Myburgh, and Schlemmer, "Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa," 165.

^{xiii} Schrire, "The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences."

^{xiv} Maloka, "'White' Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in South Africa," 233.

^{xv} Nijzink, "Opposition in the New South African Parliament," 65.

^{xvi} Lodge, *Politics in South Africa*, 158.

^{xvii} Ibid.

^{xviii} Jolobe, "The DA: Consolidating the Official Opposition," 137.

^{xix} Booysen, "Congress of the People: Between Foothold of Hope and Slippery Slope," 98.

^{xx} Ferreira, "Cope's Coalition Talks 'Reason' for Dexter's Defection."

^{xxi} Schrire, "The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences," 142.

^{xxii} Hahndiek, *Parliament Since 1994: Achievements and Challenges*, 82.

^{xxiii} Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, *Rules of the National Assembly*, 17.

^{xxiv} Ibid., 18.

^{xxv} Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament*, 64–65.

^{xxvi} Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, *Annotated Digest of Rulings 1994-1999*: 158.

^{xxvii} Scott, 'No Interrogation, just six hours heat', *Cape Times*, October 23, 1997.

^{xxviii} 'Parliament to probe De Lille's conduct', *Cape Times*, October 28, 1997.

^{xxix} The judgement on De Lille's case at the Cape High Court was delivered on May 8 1997 and at the Supreme Court on August 26 1999.

^{xxx} 'Parliament to probe De Lille's conduct', *Cape Times*, October 28, 1997.

^{xxxi} The court's judgement was front page news the next day. Koopman, 'De Lille vs Ginwala verdict', *Cape Times*, August 27, 1999.

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^{xxxii} Andrew Feinstein, an ex-ANC MP has subsequently described this as ‘an outrageous appointment...there was no way in which the Chair of the Committee that determines the ANC’s political strategy in parliament could possibly perform the role of Speaker in an impartial and non-partisan manner’. Feinstein, *After the Party*, 235.

^{xxxiii} National Assembly of South Africa, *Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard)* Third Parliament, 3d session (September 12, 2006), Vol.96, Col 6721.

^{xxxiv} “DA Calls on Booi to Resign as MP.”

^{xxxv} Feinstein, *After the Party*, 235; Dawes, “Travelgate Facts ‘Misrepresented’.”

^{xxxvi} See for example, the complaints aired during a debate on an earlier disruption from the public gallery by FF supporters in 1997. Koos van der Merwe of the IFP accused the ANC of ‘bussing in their supporters, putting them in the public gallery, and shouting while we were speaking’. National Assembly of South Africa, *Debates of the National Assembly*, Second Parliament, 1t session (October 28, 1997), Vol. 15, Col. 5550-5558. In 2009 at the first sitting of Parliament to elect the President and swear in members, Lynda Odendaal, a woman member of the new Congress of the People (COPE) party was heckled with “miaows” as she was sworn in. The ANC Chief Whip later agreed that this had been un-parliamentary. For a report of the sitting see Hendricks, ‘Parliament Elects Zuma’, May 7, 2009.

^{xxxvii} See for example proceedings on September 22 1993. Mr DP Du Pleiss of the Conservative Party at one point asked the President (FW De Klerk of the National Party) ‘I want to ask him in connection with those Afrikaners who are going to refuse to accept the communist, anti-Christian dispensation which he is planning for South Africa in co-operation with Joe Slovo and Nelson Mandela, whether he intends compelling them into it by force of arms’. Later the same day the Leader of the Opposition, called FW De Klerk ‘a traitor’, as did every member of the CP party individually, in turn, in order that they be ordered to withdraw from the chamber. Mr FJ Le Roux makes clear the party’s intentions when he stated immediately after the Leader of the Opposition had been asked to withdraw: ‘Mr Speaker, on a point of order, I wish to draw to the Chair’s attention to the fact that all members of the CP caucus associate themselves with what the honourable Leader of the Official Opposition in this House has said. Without repeating everything, we associate ourselves fully with what he has said and we request the Chair to give the same order to all the honourable members of the CP’. Republic of South Africa, *Debates of Parliament (Hansard)*, Ninth Parliament, 5t session, (September 22, 1993), Vol.43, Col.13515-13522.

^{xxxviii} The most extreme example of this dynamic was perhaps the instance on 17 September 1998 when following a heated exchange with the presiding officer, Andre Fourie of the National Party was summoned to come the Chair immediately after an adjournment. Members of the ANC unaware that Fourie had been summoned interpreted his approaching of the Chair as threatening behaviour and several MPs crossed the floor to intervene. In the ensuing scuffle Dr Manie Schoeman (NP) and Adv Johnny de Lange (ANC) punched each other. Schoeman (whom, video footage showed, had landed the first punch) was subsequently suspended for five days and De Lange (who retaliated) for one day.

^{xxxix} Osaghe, “What Democratisation Does To Minorities Displaced From Power: The Case of White Afrikaners in South Africa,” 307.

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^{xl} National Assembly of South Africa, *Debates of the National Assembly*, Third Parliament, 3d session, (November 8, 2006), Vol. 97, Col.8346-8350.

^{xli} National Assembly of South Africa, *Debates of the National Assembly*, First Parliament, 2d session, (August 20, 1998), Vol. 20, Col.5226-5237.

^{xlii} Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, *Annotated Digest of Rulings 1994-1999*, 156.

^{xliii} National Assembly of South Africa, *Debates of the National Assembly*, First Parliament, 2d session, (August 20, 1998), Vol.20, Col.5237.

^{xliv} Steyn and Foster, "Repertoires for Talking White: Resistant Whiteness in Post-apartheid South Africa," 26.

^{xlv} National Assembly of South Africa, *Debates of the National Assembly*, First Parliament, 4t session, (March 25, 1999), Vol.25, Col.3417-3420.

^{xlvi} Osaghe, "What Democratisation Does To Minorities Displaced From Power: The Case of White Afrikaners in South Africa," 310.

^{xlvii} National Assembly of South Africa, *Debates of the National Assembly*, Third Parliament, 3d session, (June 20 2006), 39

^{xlviii} National Assembly of South Africa, *Debates of the House of Assembly*, Fourth Parliament, 1t session, (February 12, 2009), 30-31. In the points of order surrounding Groenewald's expulsion, the interventions of members of the former white parliament are particularly visible. Koos Van Der Merwe made the following speech: 'Madam Deputy Speaker, on a further point of order: May I, with great respect, remind you that before you are to rule, you must listen to all the inputs in respect of the point taken. [Interjections.] It is the same as in a court case. You cannot make a decision before you have been addressed by all. So I suggest then that you allow all members who wish to make an input on that point of order, such as Dr Mulder, to make their input before you rule. Otherwise you may rule wrongly, because certain information was not given to you'.

^{xlix} FF+ MP in interview with Victoria Hasson, cited in Hasson, "Deliberative Tradition in Parliament of South Africa."

^l National Assembly of South Africa, *Debates of the National Assembly*, Third Parliament, 3d session, (September 5, 2007), 13-17

^{li} *Ibid.*, 17

^{lii} National Assembly of South Africa, *Debates of the House of Assembly*, Third Parliament, 3d session, (September 6, 2007), 5.

^{liii} 'DA MP ejected from the Chamber', *Mail and Guardian*, September 21, 2010.

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^{liv} Steyn and Foster, “Repertoires for Talking White: Resistant Whiteness in Post-apartheid South Africa,” 33; Southall, *Opposition and Democracy in South Africa*, 18.

^{lv} Maré, “Race, Democracy and Opposition in South African Politics: As Other a Way as Is Possible,” 95.

^{lvi} Steyn and Foster, “Repertoires for Talking White: Resistant Whiteness in Post-apartheid South Africa,” 33.

^{lvii} National Assembly of South Africa, *Debates of the National Assembly*, Fourth Parliament, 2d session, (February 16, 2010), 25

^{lviii} Ibid., 26.

^{lix} Ibid., 29-30.

^{lx} Ibid., 30-31

^{lxi} Davidson, Statement on the suspension of Dianne Kohler Barnard, February 17, 2010.

^{lxii} Steenkamp, ‘F-Word puts MP on the map’, *Die Burger*, February 24, 2010.

^{lxiii} Du Plessis and Du Plessis, ‘F-Word slur in parliament’, *Cape Argus*, February 17, 2010, 1

^{lxiv} Comments left on, Steenkamp, ‘F-Word puts MP on the map’.

^{lxv} Based on personal observations from the National Assembly public gallery.

^{lxvi} These details are based on personal observations from the public gallery and discussion with parliamentary staff on the day of the withdrawal.

^{lxvii} ‘DA MP Ordered Out of the House’, November 12, 2010.

^{lxviii} Ibid.

^{lxix} See Armitage in this volume.

^{lxx} Southall, *Opposition and Democracy in South Africa*, 9.

^{lxxi} Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament*, 99.

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